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The Multilateral Tax Instrument: how to Avoid a




Action 15 of the OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project is to “develop a multilateral
instrument designed to provide an innovative approach to international tax matters”.1 The authors turn
to two areas of academic thought to clarify the choices faced by states when engaging in either bilateral
or multilateral tax treaties. One is the field of international relations, and especially the “neoliberal”
approach based on the economic self-interest of states. The other is political philosophy, and especially
Brennan and Buchanan’s “veil of uncertainty”.2 The authors argue that, as the economic gains of combating
BEPS are uncertain, multilateral agreement will be easier to achieve on matters of design and concept,
than on specific rules which have an uncertain distributive impact on states’ economies. The
recommendations of the BEPS Final Report are, therefore, useful to the extent that they provide a starting
point for reconsidering the architecture of international taxation, that is, for answering the question:
“what would we want the taxation of multinational enterprise (MNE) profits to look like in 2025?”
Introduction
Research question and outline
The existing network of bilateral tax treaties is extensive and hard to adjust to changing
circumstances. At the same time, circumstances have indeed been changing—low effective tax
burdens on MNE profits make for newspaper headlines, and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) are underscoring the fact that the current international tax regime works to the detriment
of developing countries. These concerns will reshape the ways in which MNE profits are taxed.
A first step is the OECDBEPS project that started in 2013. Action 15 of this project is to “develop
amultilateral instrument designed to provide an innovative approach to international taxmatters”.3
The authors argue that the choices made by states to co-operate in either bilateral or multilateral
relations reflect the perceptions these states have of the economic gain resulting from either
course of action. The authors suggest that these perceptions have, typically, two dimensions:
size and uncertainty. The dimension of “size” reflects a state’s perception of the gains to be made
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**Professor of Tax Law, Department of Tax Law, Leiden University.
1OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 15: A Mandate for the Development of a Multilateral
Instrument on Tax Treaty Measures to Tackle BEPS (OECD, 2015) (Action 15).
2G. Brennan and J.M. Buchanan, “The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy” in the Collected Works
of James M. Buchanan (Indianapolis IN: Liberty Fund Inc, 1985), Vol.10, Ch.2, section VII.
3Action 15, above fn.1.
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from co-operation with (an)other state(s); the larger the perceived gain (the “size of the pie”),
the more the negotiations will tend to focus on distribution of the gain between participating
states. The dimension of “uncertainty” reflects a negotiating state’s lack of knowledge of the
future impact of alternative courses of action on its own position (whatever the “size of the pie”).
The larger this uncertainty, the less “distributive” the negotiations will tend to be.
If the economic gains of co-operation are perceived to be large and certain, states will be
inclined to distribute the gains in bilateral agreements. If gains are expected to be small and
uncertain, states will tend to focus on general multilateral principles of co-operation rather than
agreement on specific rules. In between these extreme positions, multilateral agreement is easier
to achieve on matters of design and concept (“rules of the road”), than on specific rules which
have distributive impact by affecting the economic positions of states. The authors argue that
the recommendations in the BEPS Final Report generally fit into this pattern, at least to the extent
that distributive issues are avoided.
In the remainder of this Introduction, Action 15 will be placed in historical context. Thereafter,
the theory of international relations will be used to provide some analytical framework, with the
assumption that self-interested welfare-maximising states are the most useful point of departure
for the analysis of states’ “behaviour” in concluding tax treaties (“Regime change in the theory
of international relations”). Next, some recent economic contributions to the tax treaties literature
will be discussed in order to explain the choices made by states between bilateral and multilateral
forms of co-operation in terms of distribution of economic benefit. The existence of external
(spill over) effects is shown to present an important challenge to that analysis (“The neoliberal
view on tax treaty relations”). Under “A multilateral instrument to amend bilateral tax treaties”,
the existence of a “veil of uncertainty” is considered in order to show how negotiating states
may be affected by uncertainty regarding the impact of (new) rules on their economic positions.
The resulting analytical framework is used to discuss the feasibility of a multilateral approach
for several potential tax policy changes, and to suggest a design strategy for a multilateral
agreement to amend bilateral tax treaties.
The OECD’s proposed multilateral tax instrument
The explanation of Action 15 reads:
“There is a need to consider innovative ways to implement the measures resulting from the
work on the BEPS action plan (…). This is for example the case for the introduction of an
anti-treaty abuse provision, changes to the definition of permanent establishment, changes
to transfer pricing provisions and the introduction of treaty provisions in relation to hybrid
mismatch arrangements. Changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention are not directly
effective without amendments to bilateral tax treaties. If undertaken on a purely
treaty-by-treaty basis, the sheer number of treaties in effect may make such a process very
lengthy, the more so where countries embark on comprehensive renegotiations of their
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bilateral tax treaties. A multilateral instrument to amend bilateral treaties is a promising
way forward in this respect.”4
And the 2014 progress report specifies:
“The main objective of a multilateral instrument would be to modify existing bilateral tax
treaties, in a synchronised and efficient manner, to implement treaty measures developed
in the course of the BEPS Project, without a need to individually renegotiate each treaty
within the 3000+ treaty network.”5
What the instrument would do is to shift the balance between multilateral agreement and
national autonomy. The current practice is that multilateral instruments, such as the OECDModel
and Commentary serve as guidelines for national states. By agreeing with new guidelines, national
states show a basic willingness to move in the same direction—but they are free to modify, to
postpone, etc., in their bilateral treaty relations. The multilateral instrument would
“modify a limited number of provisions common to most existing bilateral treaties, and
would, for those treaties that do not already have such provisions, add new provisions
specifically designed to counter BEPS”.6
To illustrate the issues at stake, a relevant example is the revision (as suggested in Actions 1
and 7) of the exceptions to the permanent establishment (PE) status, to ensure that these exceptions
are available only for activities that are in fact of a preparatory or auxiliary nature. The
PE-threshold is, therefore, lowered. The idea of Action 15 is that an amendment of article 5 of
the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) may take many years to get incorporated in
each and every of the several thousand bilateral tax treaties, and that a multilateral instrument
should be developed to speed things up. The final BEPS reports mention tax treaty amendments
on many other issues, some of a very specific nature (for example, dual residence, transparent
entities in the context of hybrid mismatches and tax treaty abuse), others more general (for
example, rules on mutual agreement procedures).7
This is not what used to be called a “multilateral tax treaty”.8 Ever since the 1920s, the emerging
system of bilateral treaties was considered a kind of second-best solution to the multilateral treaty
4OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris:
OECD Publishing, 2013), 23–24, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en [Accessed 18 January
2016].
5OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (Paris: OECDPublishing, 2014), available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264219250-en [Accessed
18 January 2016] (Developing a Multilateral Instrument).
6OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument, above fn.5, 17–18.
7See OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015); OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015) (Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits); OECD, Making Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015).
8 K. Brooks, “The Potential of Multilateral Tax Treaties” in M. Lang, et al. (eds), Tax Treaties: Building Bridges
between Law and Economics (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010), 211–236, provides a synopsis of the different uses of the
concept; see especially Brooks’ footnote 25 at 219. See also M. Lang, et al. (eds), Multilateral Tax Treaties: New
Developments in International Tax Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998).
The Multilateral Tax Instrument: how to Avoid a Stalemate on Distributional Issues? 41
[2016] BTR, No.1 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
that might one day prove feasible. It was only in the 1990s that the OECD explicitly abandoned
that goal. The old-style multilateral treaty would have included substantive rules (for example,
definitions of “interest”, “resident”, “PE”, or a bandwidth of mandatory withholding tax rates)
and would have been able to completely replace the bilateral tax treaty network.What developed
in fact over the last century was a system of bilateral treaties loosely co-ordinated by a non-binding
multilateral instrument, theModel Tax Convention and its Commentary. This type of co-ordination
has not been able to prevent the many problems of rule effectiveness now addressed in the BEPS
project. And the new-style multilateral instrument as aimed at in Action 15, would basically
make OECD agreements more binding, having direct impact on the text and/or the interpretation
of bilateral treaties.
Conceptually, the authors do not advocate a sharp distinction between bilateralism and
multilateralism in the area of international tax co-operation. It has been argued that the “weak”
multilateralism now being developed by the OECD will end up in a full multilateral tax treaty
to replace all bilateral treaties.9 That is, in the authors’ opinion, a premature conclusion. On the
other hand, Avery Jones has argued that:
“What countries really do is to sign up to variations on the Model Treaty.
Practitioners would save a lot of time if treaties were presented as variations to theModel
Treaty; we would not need to read the rest to see whether it has been changed.”10
It follows that the existing network of bilateral treaties can be interpreted as a (long) list of
reservations on the OECDMTC—which would allow us to see the existing system as essentially
multilateral in the “strong” sense. That is, in the authors’ view, an interesting issue of semantics.
But it does point at the relevance of reservations, to which the authors will return. Summing up,
the authors’ interest is in a legal instrument that increases the role of multilateral agreement in
adapting or re-interpreting the rules contained in bilateral treaties.
Regime change in the theory of international relations
Adding a multilateral instrument to the existing patchwork of bilateral treaties could qualify as
a “regime” change in the literature on international relations between national states. An
international regime is a set of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures that
guides states’ actions in any specific field of international co-operation. Regimes should be
distinguished from international agreements: the purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements.11
Applied to the field of taxation, relevant principles could be, for example, national tax sovereignty,
an idea of states’ “fair shares” based on concepts like source and residence, a perception of the
international tax environment as a competitive “market” for foreign direct investment (FDI).
The relevant norms can be found in the different MTCs, with the OECD model and its
9 A. Miller and A. Kirkpatrick, “The Use of Multilateral Instruments to Achieve the BEPS Action Plan Agenda”
[2013] BTR 686.
10 J. Avery Jones, “The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?” (1999) 53 Tax Law Review 1, 6.
11 S.D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables” in S.D. Krasner
(ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 185–205, at 186–187. Krasner notes at
187: “regime-governed behaviour must not be based solely on short-term calculations of interest. Since regimes
encompass principles and norms, the utility function that is being maximized must embody some sense of general
obligation”.
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Commentary as the dominant one. The “rules” are the terms of bilateral treaties. Moreover,
decision-making procedures are predominantly national (tax administration and tax courts) and
are added to by mutual agreement procedures. The regime change would imply that the set of
decision-making procedures is enlarged by a multilateral instrument that is able to generate not
just new norms but also new rules. It could also imply changes in underlying principles: a reduced
role of national tax sovereignty, a changing perception of “fair shares”, and/or a more co-operative
idea of the international tax environment.
The literature on international relations has developed along several lines, based on different
and often competing views on states, on politics and on the role of academic analysis. The authors
followRing in identifying three traditions that seem particularly relevant to international taxation.12
One is (neo)realism. In this view, states are rational actors in an anarchic world. For
international regimes to develop in such a world, dominant states have to take the lead. The
inference would be that shifts in dominance could be regarded as triggering regime change. The
existing regime, loosely based on the OECD consensus, may be seen as reflecting US dominance.
The BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) challenge this consensus—and even
without that, the relative weight of the EU in international taxation has tended to increase.
A second view is (neo)liberalism. It also assumes that states are the relevant actors; but here
the focus is on a “market” idea of economic rationality. States enter into co-operative regimes
if, and only if, there are gains to be had from co-operation. That could be the case with “club”
goods (such as joint defence or free trade) where non-participants can be excluded from the
benefits of co-operation. But even with public goods (such as the reduction of pollution) where
exclusion is more difficult, a co-operative regime is possible under the condition that the cost
of free-riders (states that defect or are unco-operative) is not prohibitive and/or that free-riding
can be reduced by “buying” the support of initially unco-operative states. The analysis focuses
on the size and distribution of the gains of co-operation, and on transaction costs, also related
to the number of participating states. In this view, the feasibility of a shift from the existing
regime to a more committing multilateral regime must be analysed by comparing net gains or
losses for each participating state. Assuming that states maximise national welfare, the impact
of alternative regimes on national gross domestic products (GDPs) is a relevant measure.
A third view is constructivism. It is a post-modern approach in that it centres on the ways in
which our views on international relations are framed by (implicit) principles and by the analytical
tools used. This approach generates an interest in the role of beliefs and ideas in conceptualising
issues of international co-operation. Applied to the topic at hand, constructivism underscores
the potential role of social debate in international taxation, in tax avoidance and in fair shares.
Regime change would come about as a result of changing views on the interests at stake in
international taxation.
As this very brief discussion shows, each of these perspectives may have relevance for
understanding the prospects of increased multilateralism. The authors will, however, focus on
the neoliberal tradition for several reasons. First, most of the literature in the field of tax
co-operation and co-ordination fits in this tradition, as it employs a model of self-interested
players in a “game”. To be sure, there is also some literature that explores the relevance of
12D.M. Ring, “International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications” (2007) 60 Tax Law Review 83, offers an excellent
overview of the international relations literature from the perspective of international taxation.
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leadership in the making of the international tax order—usually with the US as the “Stackelberg”
leader.13 This literature suggests, for example, that states can play the “tax game” co-operatively,
when a large capital exporting state unilaterally adopts the full residence principle. Under the
“umbrella” of that principle, smaller states will have no incentive to reduce their source state
tax rates. The authors infer from this line of reasoning that the chances of BEPS achieving some
result will depend on the participation of large players, but the authors do not intend to formalise
this result (which is plausible enough without having recourse to game theory). Secondly, the
constructivist approach can, for practical purposes, easily be subsumed under the neoliberal
approach, even if the idea of “fair shares” may be hard to fit in with a self-interest perspective.14
If public opinion will indeed continue to ask for a more effective taxation of international capital
flows, that can simply be taken as increasing states’ gains in achieving that goal. For national
politicians, there will be gains to be had by playing the role of “fighters against international tax
avoidance”.
By focusing on the neoliberal interpretation of states’ “behaviour” in concluding tax treaties,
the authors implicitly accept a number of assumptions. A recent review of the literature on
“rational design” of international co-operative regimes15 mentions four assumptions that fit in
with the neoliberal approach to treaty negotiations. These are: 1. rationality: states develop
co-operative regimes to serve their interests; 2. the expected gains are sufficiently large to enhance
co-operation; 3. establishing forms of co-operation is costly; 4. states are risk-averse, that is,
they try to reduce the eventuality of outcomes which negatively impact upon their future positions.
13 R.H. Gordon, “Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?” (1992) Journal of Finance 1159; R.
Altshuler and T.J. Goodspeed, “Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and US Tax Competition” (2014) Public
Finance Review 1. Stackelberg leadership (named after the German economist Heinrich von Stackelberg) is a specific
game with two unequal participants, in which the smaller participant adapts to the choices made by the stronger one.
14The idea that states should have a “fair share” of theMNE corporate tax base is intuitively appealing; it may develop
into a kind of battle cry of NGOs defending developing countries’ tax interests. Finding a workable substantive norm
for “fair shares” has proven elusive though. The seminal attempt was R.A.Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave, “Inter-nation
Equity” in R.M. Bird and J.G. Head (eds),Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1972), 63–85. See the appreciative discussion by K. Brooks, “Inter-nation Equity: The Development
of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax Policy Objective” in J.G. Head and R. Krever (eds), Tax
Reform in the 21st Century: A Volume in Memory of Richard Musgrave (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 2009), 471–498. The Musgraves’ interesting point of departure was “national neutrality”: cross-border
investments should at least generate the same before-tax return as domestic investments. To the excess, the source
state has a claim which may be stronger as the residence state is richer and the source state is poorer. Making this
idea workable requires that tax treaties cover a much broader range of topics than they traditionally do (including the
corporate tax rates applicable in bilateral relations). See also A.C. Infanti, “Internation Equity andHumanDevelopment”
in Y. Brauner and M. Stewart (eds), Tax, Law and Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013),
209–240 for a further development of the idea that poor countries should get a larger claim on MNE profits. And a
more recent application (remarkably, without reference to the Musgraves’ work) is A. Rosenzweig, “Defining a
Country’s Fair Share of Taxes” (2015) Florida State University Law Review 373. Rosenzweig advocates that the
residence state has a claim to some minimum return, to be calculated at arm’s length; any MNE profits in excess of
this normal return should be divided among all states involved, using formulary apportionment. Both the Musgraves
and Rosenzweig have difficulty in developing an “equity” norm independent of neutrality norms. One contribution
that does try to develop an independent equity norm is A. Christians, “Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract”
(2009) Minnesota Journal of International Law 99. Christians’ analysis fits into the constructivist tradition, arguing
that the OECD is in fact developing new minimum norms for inter-state “behaviour” in tax matters.
15B. Koremenos, C. Lipson and D. Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions” (2001) International
Organization 761, 781–782.
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These assumptions do not require us to believe that states’ behaviour in concluding tax treaties
is strictly rational. The intuitions underlying tax treaty negotiations (reduction of both tax frontiers
and avoidance options) may be plausible enough and may mean that the requirements of
assumptions 1. and 2. are met. But the fundamental question: “what do states gain by concluding
tax treaties?” has only recently been explored empirically16; and we may assume that states
conclude tax treaties under conditions of uncertainty regarding the size (and their own share) of
economic gains—which means that assumption 4. is critical. In the authors’ discussion, the
authors will take account of the potential impact of uncertainty on the feasibility of multilateral
tax instruments.
The neoliberal view on tax treaty relations
Introduction
The authors will discuss arguments recently developed by Rixen,17 and by Thompson andVerdier.18
But to start with, it should be noted that both contributions are best understood as addressing
negotiations on withholding tax rates. Issues of double income taxation can be resolved
unilaterally: from any state’s perspective, it is optimal to offer either a foreign tax credit or full
exemption to its resident investors19 (even when tax treaties would still be useful to co-ordinate
source rules, the definition of residency, exchange of information, etc.). The mutual reduction
of withholding taxes, on the other hand, is a game that includes important distributional issues
as far as the tax revenues of treaty partners are concerned.
Bilateralism as a response to asymmetric interests
Rixen presents the tax treaty negotiation game as being focused on withholding taxes. He does
argue, however, that bilateral tax treaties are settled upon by states because they provide a better
solution for reducing double taxation than a state offering unilateral relief for foreign taxation
of residents. That is, he believes, because a reduction of tax levied at source reduces the cost of
relief. It would seem that this reasoning is based on a very specific assumption: that withholding
taxes are creditable under home state tax rules. Under exemption systems, this is not typically
the case (as the foreign income is exempted, the tax burdens on that income are ignored).
But Rixen does not need that assumption: his basic argument is that states have asymmetric
(source or residence) interests in setting withholding tax rates. For each bilateral negotiation, a
state has a (net) source or residence interest. Net importers (of capital, labour, etc.) favour taxation
at source. Alternatively, net export states want to protect their resident investors’ interests and
16A. Lejour, The Foreign Investment Effects of Tax Treaties, CPBDiscussion Paper 265 (The Hague, The Netherlands:
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2013) finds that the level of a state’s participation in the tax
treaty network has a significant positive impact on its FDI stock, while noting that previous empirical studies found
little (or even a negative) effect.
17 T. Rixen, “Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The Political Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation”
(2010) European Journal of International Relations 589.
18 A. Thompson and D. Verdier, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design” (2014) International Studies
Quarterly 15.
19A. Easson, “DoWe Still Need Tax Treaties?” (2000) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 619; T. Dagan,
“The Tax Treaties Myth” (2000) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 939.
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thus seek to lower taxation at source. However, in reality, states have interests that differ from
one interstate relationship to another, as economic flows between states are not reciprocal. As
Rixen points out:
“[B]eing a net exporter or net importer is a relational attribute that can vary with respect to
different countries. Country A could have source interests in relation to country B, if A is
a net capital importer from B. At the same time, Amight have residence interests in relation
to country C, exporting capital to C. In relation to country D, there might not be any
distributive conflict, if capital flows between A and D are symmetric.”20
Rixen therefore rationalises the dominance of bilateral agreements in the tax field as a
co-ordination game driven by distributive concerns. He argues that a full multilateral approach
(as in the “old” idea of a multilateral treaty) would only be needed when bilateral treaties had
sizeable external effects. He believes that this is not the case. The only justification for a
multilateral initiative is reduction of transaction costs by disseminating information and shared
practices in the form of a model convention that provides a focal point for bilateral negotiations.
This, of course, neatly describes the status quo.
It should be added that there is a dynamic side to the distributive concerns that drive bilateral
co-ordination.When states set withholding taxes optimally, by implication they must have taken
into account the impact of relevant tax base elasticities to maximise overall welfare. Reducing
those tax rates in bilateral treaties will cause market responses in terms of mobility and economic
growth, and have an impact on overall welfare as well. Assuming (as the neoliberal tradition
does) that states enter a contract because of some net advantage, it follows that State A will be
prepared to reduce its withholding tax rates (and accept a loss in tax revenue) vis-à-vis State B,
if and only if it expects a gain that exceeds the tax revenue loss. The same applies to State B’s
position. The contracting parties’ games may therefore be more complicated than assumed by
the simple term “distribution”—there will usually be a longer-term positive sum to be distributed,
depending on expected market responses.
Bilateralism as a means to maximise membership surplus
Thompson and Verdier offer a slightly different approach—or at least, different analytical tools.
They argue that the driving force behind concluding treaties is “member surplus”: the gains that
each party draws from participation (the concept is, probably, not very different from Rixen’s
distributional gains). Bilateral approaches allow for tailor-made negotiation on the distribution
of the surplus. Multilateral treaties save on negotiation costs, but are feasible only if the
membership surplus can be distributed with sufficient precision. Their conclusion is that
multilateralism is most attractive when 1. transaction costs for the bilateral alternative are high
while 2. the membership surplus of co-operation is low. The latter may mean that members’
costs of complying with the treaty are low and/or that externalities for non-participants are high
(that is, many of the gains of an agreement would leak away to non-participants). Vice versa,
bilateralism is most attractive when 1. the transaction costs of a bilateral deal are low while 2.
20Rixen, above fn.17, 597.
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the membership surplus of co-operation is high (that is, parties are able to exclude non-participants
from the benefits of their agreement).
The authors will illustrate the point made by Thompson and Verdier by an example, to show
that their approach is able to explain the institutional setup of withholding tax reductions. Assume
for simplicity that the only issue in concluding tax treaties was the level of national withholding
taxes on dividends. Now States A and B can create “member surplus” by concluding a bilateral
treaty reducing those tax rates. Their expected gains in national welfare depend on the existing
stocks of investment by State A in State B, and by State B in State A (which determines the
initial loss in withholding tax revenue) and by expected changes in future flows of those
investments (which predict gains in national welfare). As withholding taxes are typically
inefficient disincentives to FDI, we may expect that mutual reduction of such taxes is a positive
sum game. That is, there is membership surplus to be divided. And the division of the surplus
is typically determined by negotiating tax rate reductions. The outcome may well be that State
A reduces its withholding tax rate to 15 per cent, while State B is prepared to settle for 5 per
cent. The reason may be that State A has a higher statutory rate to start with; that it has much
higher stocks of “State-B” investments than vice versa; or that it expects a smaller inflow of new
investments (hence, smaller gains) compared to State B’s expectations.
As to the transaction costs of forging bilateral treaties to reduce withholding taxes, these can
safely be assumed to be relatively low. Unlike, for instance, negotiations on human rights which
require agreement on more principled (“constitutional”) matters that surpass deep ideological
rifts,21 reduction of withholding taxes is simply a matter of money. It is in essence a reciprocal
exchange of commitments (“I reduce my tax rate if you reduce yours”). Moreover, the OECD
Model and Commentary have further reduced transaction costs by providing focal points for
negotiations and by creating a high degree of uniformity in the interpretation and application of
bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD Model. Indeed, most existing bilateral tax treaties are
based on the OECD Model; and the Commentaries are widely used in their interpretation.22
Now consider, still following Thompson and Verdier, that States A and B have the alternative
of concluding a multilateral treaty with States C to Z. The authors assume that this treaty sets
the withholding tax rate on dividends at a level of 10 per cent for all participants. The
“membership surplus” will still be positive. It will also be much larger than the surplus of the
bilateral A-B treaty, as all the world is now involved. But the relevant benchmark is rather the
joint surplus of all bilateral A-Z treaties. Then, obviously, the positions of many states will be
harmed by the inflexibility of the 10 per cent tax rate. Considering their stocks of FDI and their
expectations of future investment flows, states will actually prefer a zero rate in some bilateral
relations while preferring 15 per cent in other cases. Their acceptance of a general 10 per cent
rate implies an offer—and if the offer is too big compared to the gains of increased FDI, a state
will not participate in the multilateral treaty and will prefer rather bilateral solutions.
21 e.g. M. Craven, “Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law” (2000)
European Journal of International Law 489.
22M. Lang, et al. (eds), The Impact of the OECD and UN Model Conventions on Bilateral Tax Treaties (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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The substance of tax treaties: distributive issues and “rules of the road”
The analysis of Thompson and Verdier leads to the same conclusion as that arrived at by Rixen:
a bilateral setting allows states to benefit optimally from negotiating a reduction of withholding
taxes. In Rixen’s case, the reason is asymmetry in investment relations; with Thompson and
Verdier, the reason may also be differences in (initial) tax rates and in tax revenue requirements
that reflect differences in underlying attitudes towards the role of government in the national
economy.
It must be stressed that both analyses apply specifically to the setting of withholding tax rates
and treat bilateral and multilateral agreements as alternative approaches. Of course, tax treaties
typically domuchmore than reducing withholding tax rates. For one thing, they define concepts,
such as “resident”, “dividend”, etc.—concepts that can be labelled “rules of the road”.
The typical Prisoners’ Dilemma game is based on the assumption that there is just one
Pareto-optimal outcome, which can only be obtained when parties are able to commit credibly
to co-operation. But there are games with more than one Pareto-optimal outcome. Brennan and
Buchanan label these “rules of the road”,23 as they literally include the driving left/right choice.
The classic example: two cars arrive at an intersection simultaneously.24One car, a Volkswagen,
is northbound. The other car, a Volvo, is eastbound. There are two ways for them to cross the
intersection safely: either the Volvo goes first, or the Volkswagen does. But: neither of the two
car drivers wants to wait. There are two possible solution rules. A first option is a co-ordination
rule that is based on the specific characteristics of either of the two actors. For instance, such a
rule could hold: all Volvos drive on and all Volkswagens wait. As the same actor will always
get the outcome he prefers, such a co-ordination rule is likely to have distributional implications,
which makes co-operative solutions hard to achieve. Another option is that the actors adopt a
rule in which the context determines who gets his most preferred outcome. Ideally, such a
“fairness” rule would ensure that all actors get their preferred outcome half the time. Both “right
gives way” and “right has precedence” meet this requirement: sometimes, the Volvo comes from
the right, sometimes the Volkswagen. Once an equilibrium is set, no driver would gain from
deviating from the outcome, as he would only hurt himself.25
More generally, one can think of the choice of technical standards, units of measurement, and
the choice of a forum language for international communication.26 When first making the choice,
states will prefer one option over another. But as soon as an international consensus starts to
emerge, individual states have little incentive to defect. To some extent, choosing common
definitions will even have network effects. As the number of states that apply a common concept
or standard increases, so does the incentive for other states to join in. But it should be kept in
mind that the first stage of the process (“we need a definition of residency, but which one?”)
may be a sensitive one as divergent interests may be at stake.27 Nevertheless, when we look at
23Brennan and Buchanan, above fn.2.
24 A.A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1990), 37–38.
25L.L. Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism” (1992) International Organization 765, 775.
26Ring, above fn.12, 132–133.
27The OECD MTC is fairly specific about the meaning of concepts that refer to forms of income (such as dividends,
capital gains, profits, interest, etc.) perhaps because these concepts have a reasonably well-definedmeaning in business
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tax treaty practice, it is evident that multilateralism has been strongest in the field of concepts.
There is simply no point in renegotiating concepts like “dividend” in every bilateral treaty relation.
Evidently, when we leave the specific field of withholding tax rates, there is no longer a need
to choose between bilateral and multilateral approaches.
As to two other important elements of bilateral tax treaties (exchange of information provisions
and anti-abuse rules) the authors suggest that a more thorough analysis is required. On the one
hand, we see multilateralism through the OECDMTC and Commentary, and more in particular,
through instruments such as the EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation in Taxation.28 On
the other hand, there is evident scope for fine-tuning of provisions in bilateral relations to reflect
differences in national legal environments (for example, banking secrecy) and national economic
conditions (for example, a strong tax planning industry).
Introducing external effects of tax treaties
In the previous section, it has been shown that the reduction of withholding tax rates through
bilateral tax treaties can be adequately explained by Rixen’s and Thompson and Verdier’s work.
However, these analyses do not take into account external effects (spill-overs), which are
indeed at the core of the OECD’s BEPS project. These effects have been studied in BEPS Action
11; the overall estimate is that BEPS accounts for a worldwide reduction in corporate tax revenues
of between 4 and 10 per cent.29
It should be noted that much of this tax revenue loss cannot be dealt with by amending tax
treaties. Differences in corporate income tax rates in particular remain a major source of external
effects (each state’s tax rate choice depending on the choices made by others).
The spill-over effects of tax treaties are labelled “network externalities”: “if country A, having
a treaty with country B, signs a treaty with country C, it may in effect create a treaty between B
and C”.30 These externalities are created by some familiar traits of the international tax order,
such as the concept of residence and the separate entity approach. Returning to the analyses of
Rixen and Thompson andVerdier: if two states conclude an agreement to reduce their withholding
tax rates, a resident of a third state can get access to those reduced rates, depending on the
residence criteria used by State A and/or State B. The size of this externality is significant though
hard to calculate. One sign is that nearly 40 per cent of worldwide FDI stocks is located in just
10 countries representing 3 per cent of worldwide GDP. Of these countries, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and Belgium are the largest—and, interestingly, 7 out of 10 are EUMember States.31
life. It is not surprising that the MTC is much less precise when it comes to concepts referring to factual situations,
especially residency.
28 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and
repealing Directive 77/799/EEC [2011] OJ L64/1.
29 OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015) (Measuring and Monitoring BEPS).
30 IMF, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, IMF Policy Paper (9 May 2014), 14, and further discussion
at 25–28.
31 IMF, above fn.30, 6; OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, above fn.29, 49–51, offers comparable figures
without specifying the states involved.
The Multilateral Tax Instrument: how to Avoid a Stalemate on Distributional Issues? 49
[2016] BTR, No.1 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
Another indication is that the tax revenue loss to developing countries in particular may well
run into the billions.32
The existence of sizeable external effects of bilateral tax treaty provisions reduces the rationale
for concluding bilateral treaties—or, as a recent IMF paper summarises: “considerable caution
is needed in entering into any bilateral tax treaty”.33 The only way to “repair” the treaty network
is, the IMF suggests, by the general adoption of Limitation on Benefits (LOB) clauses (as
suggested in OECD Action 634).
The presence of external effects may also underscore the relevance of a multilateral approach
in reducing externalities, which is what the BEPS project is about. In contrast to the reduction
of double taxation, combatting BEPS has the character of a collective action problem—a public
good issue.35 It requires wide or even global participation to be effective, while to any state, free
riding (defecting) is an attractive option. For example, for many states the adoption of LOB
clauses is typically a collective-decision-making problem. Regulating BEPS might hence
intuitively be better served by multilateralism in the form of the multilateral instrument of Action
15.
A multilateral instrument to amend bilateral tax treaties
The size of the pie
A response to the externalities pointed out above would be to move from co-ordination (as
discussed under “Bilateralism as a response to asymmetric interests” and “Bilateralism as a
means to maximise membership surplus”) to co-operation in the area of international taxation,
where common goals are given precedence over national goals.
However, the gains of co-operation in the international tax area (the “size of the pie”) are not
that clear. As we have seen, for a multilateral tax instrument to be viable, states must be able to
foresee net benefits (the multilateral deal should be a “positive sum game”). These benefits could
be measured by means of the membership surplus. As previously referred to,36 there are two
sides to this surplus: it has to be significant, and it must be possible to limit free-riding.
In principle, there is indeed significant surplus to be gained. This is also reflected in the BEPS
Action Plan. Indeed, one of its fundamental conceptions is that in order to remain sovereign in
the international tax area, states must co-operate,37 as:
“Inaction in this area would likely result in some governments losing corporate tax revenue,
the emergence of competing sets of international standards and the replacement of the
32 IMF, above fn.30, 27.
33 IMF, above fn.30, 27.
34OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits, above fn.7, 5.
35On public goods and private goods in general: R. Cornes and T. Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods,
and Club Goods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
36See “Bilateralism as a means to maximise membership surplus”.
37 Schermers and Blokker have coined this the “sovereignty paradox”. See H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker,
International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity, 5th revised edn (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011),
section 1887. See also in general: A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
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current consensus-based framework by unilateral measures, which could lead to a global
tax chaos.”38
Just how significant is the surplus: that is, where does the uncertainty begin? Three types of
uncertainty can be discerned. There are uncertainties about: 1. the severity of BEPS activities;
2. the impact of BEPS activities on national revenues and investments; and 3. the national
economic implications of different policy responses. In the end, countries will have to evaluate
three alternative scenarios. Either the corporation income tax will become obsolete and slowly
fade away, or a proliferation of unilateral measures will protect national tax bases—or, as a result
of the BEPS project, improved multilateral co-operation will restore a credible tax environment
for MNEs.
As regards 1., although there is abundant evidence of sizeable profit shifting, it remains difficult
to distinguish “acceptable” from “unacceptable” profit shifting behaviour,39 the more so because
the distinction itself is part of the BEPS project. Consequently, it is hard for states to estimate
how much tax revenue they lose as a result of BEPS behaviour (point 2). It is the explicit aim
of BEPSAction 11 to improve the quality and availability of relevant data—but, evidently, much
work still needs to be done.
Moreover, even if the loss of tax revenue due to BEPS behaviour could be calculated, this
figure would not directly inform us about the loss of welfare (for example: a lowMNE tax burden
must, in the end, benefit individuals, be it shareholders, employees or customers). Some caution
is therefore required as regards the overall welfare benefits of tackling BEPS.40 As to prevention
of free-riding (that is, excluding non-participant states from the benefits of effective MNE
taxation), much will depend on the substantive steps taken. If these steps do not include rules
that strengthen the tie between the state where tax is paid and the taxpayer’s “economic reality”,41
free-riding is a persistent threat to the goals of the BEPS project. In any event, the gains to be
had from the BEPS project may not, in themselves, be so evident that they could operate as a
“game changer”.
And as regards point 3: assuming that a multilateral tax instrument allows for the rapid
implementation of new or altered concepts in the tax treaties of all participating states, how can
states be sure what the impact on their own position would be? And how would that affect their
willingness to “sign in”?
38OECD, Action Plan, above fn.4, 10–11.
39C. Fuest, C. Spengel, K. Finke, J. Heckemeyer and H. Nusser, Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by
Multinational Firms: Issues and Options for Reform, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 13-044 (2013). D. Dharmapala,
What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature, CESifo Working
Paper, No. 4612 (2014) makes no such estimates but discusses the empirical evidence onMNE tax planning behaviour.
A fairly low “consensus” value seems to be in sight for the impact of changes in relative tax rates on MNEs’ tax
planning activity. Dharmapala notes at 31 that “in the more recent empirical literature, which uses new and richer
sources of data, the estimated magnitude of BEPS is typically much smaller than that found in earlier studies”.
40 Remember that the official economic impact assessment of the CCCTB concluded that its adoption would not
increase overall welfare in the EU. CPB Netherlands for Economic Policy Analysis, The Economic Effects of
EU-Reforms in Corporate Income Tax Systems, Study for the European Commission Directorate General for Taxation
and Customs Union TAXUD/2007/DE/324 (October 2009).
41The authors use speech marks here, because they do not want to enter the discussion on how to define economic
reality.
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The veil of uncertainty
The literature on the impact of uncertainty on negotiations is fairly unanimous in its conclusions:
when parties are uncertain as to how the choice between alternative rules will affect their own
future positions, negotiations will tend to be successful in terms of establishing principles and
concepts, rather than specific rules.
Evidently, there is John Rawls’ veil of ignorance to start with. In Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,42
he develops a contractarian approach to the choice of a fair constitution (that is, the basic rules
and institutions of a society). Rawls’ conception of fairness is that an outcome is fair whenever
the procedure generating that outcome is fair. Hence his veil of ignorance: to make sure that
people make no judgements based on short-sighted self-interest, they should be deprived of
information regarding their own positions under alternative constitutional rules and institutions.
As a result, they will agree upon a constitution that is fair towards any member of society.
Ignorance is a strong assumption, and Brennan and Buchanan, in their “Reason of Rules”,43
have coined the concept of a “veil of uncertainty”. Their setting is comparable to that of Rawls:
people participate in decision-making on the rules and institutions of their society-to-be. But
even without assuming ignorance, participants will find it difficult to estimate the impact of
general rules and principles on their own positions and economic interests in the future. They
face an uncertainty which
“serves the salutary function of making potential agreement more rather than less likely.
Faced with genuine uncertainty about how his position will be affected by the operation of
a particular rule, the individual is led by his self-interest calculus to concentrate on choice
options that eliminate or minimize prospects for potentially disastrous results.”
Here, the assumption of risk-aversion turns up again44: when faced with uncertainty, negotiators
will try to avert outcomes that may be harmful to their future positions. And the result, as Brennan
and Buchanan claim, is that each participant
“will tend to agree on arrangements that might be called ‘fair’ in the sense that patterns of
outcomes generated under such arrangements will be broadly acceptable, regardless of
where the participant might be located in such outcomes”.
That is to say, the risk-averse participant will prefer a multilateral agreement that produces
reasonable outcomes for a broad range of future states-of-the-world.
We can apply this line of reasoning to the position of states in negotiating rules for international
taxation, that is, in choosing between alternative basic rules and institutions in this field. As the
impact of these alternatives on national GDP, FDI, tax revenues, etc., becomes more difficult to
estimate, discussions will move away from quarrels over distribution, towards finding rules that
can be considered “fair”. Ring makes a similar observation; she notes that uncertainty will lead
states to integrative rather than distributive bargaining.45 That is to say: without a clear and
42 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
43Brennan and Buchanan, above fn.2: all quotes are from Ch.2, section VII, 33–36.
44See Koremenos, et al., above fn.15, on the assumptions underlying rational design of international institutions.
45Ring, above fn.12, 109.
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quantifiable goal in terms of economic gains, the focus of negotiations moves towards more
general aims such as fair rules.
The conclusion follows that binding multilateral agreement will be more easily obtainable for
general principles and concepts than for specific separate issues. For example, a general
reconsideration of the concept of treaty abuse will be easier to achieve than a rule against a
specific form of abuse. Quoting Brennan and Buchanan once more:
“As an example, consider the position of a dairy farmer (…) He might strongly oppose a
specific reduction in milk price supports, since such action will almost surely reduce his
net wealth. At the same time, however, he might support a generalized rule that would
eliminate political interference with any and all prices for services or goods. The effect of
such a rule change or institutional reform on his own net wealth is less determinate in the
latter case than in the former.”46
A synthesis: uncertainty on distributional issues
To sum up: when states face a choice between bilateral and multilateral approaches, they may
prefer the bilateral instrument when there are economic benefits that the contracting parties can
divide between them; they will be more inclined to multilateral agreement when the distributional
aspect is absent or very uncertain. To make the point more clear, the authors distinguish two
types of tax policy changes.47
On one side of the spectrum there are policy options that generate clear economic benefits.
These options are about the (re)distribution of the “pie”. In the (generally not too likely) case
that there are obvious winners and losers, reaching multilateral agreement will be difficult.
Support for this argument can be found in the founding period of the OECD MTC. The efforts
to conclude a multilateral treaty were dropped primarily due to disagreements on the formulation
of a general principle to allocate tax jurisdiction, that is, source or residence, which determined
obvious winners and losers for the division of jurisdiction over interests and dividends.48 In the
words of Carroll
“the discussions had revealed that [the adoption of a plurilateral convention] was hardly
tenable in regard to certain classes of income, notably interest and dividends, because of
the conflicts in opinions and methods of taxation”.49
46Brennan and Buchanan, above fn.2, 34.
47The same point is made by Rixen, above fn.17, 601–603.
48According to T.S. Adams, the key US Treasury tax advisor at that time, the different opinions regarding the taxation
of interest and dividends prevented the adoption of a multilateral, uniform solution. T.S. Adams, “International and
Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation”, Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Taxation under the Auspices of
the National Tax Association (9–13 September 1929), Vol.22, 192–199 at 196. See also: M.J. Graetz and M.M.
O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation” (1997) Duke Law Journal 1021, 1096–1097, who
point out that “after the League process generated substantial consensus on allocation rules except for those governing
interest and dividends, Adams urged the nations of the world to sign a multilateral agreement institutionalizing all of
the consensus rules, but leaving interest and dividends for another day”.
49M.B. Carroll, Prevention of International Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion: Two Decades of Progress under
the League of Nations (League of Nations, 1939), 33.
The Multilateral Tax Instrument: how to Avoid a Stalemate on Distributional Issues? 53
[2016] BTR, No.1 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
On the other side of the spectrum are hypothetical tax policy changes that provide completely
new techniques or terminologies for solving a new problem. It may concern “rules of the road”
for taxing new economic phenomena, or an amendment of existing principles without obvious
distributive aspects. In these cases, multilateral agreement can be reached more easily. Again,
support for this argument can be found in the founding period of the OECD MTC. Even when
it proved impossible to reach multilateral agreement on the precedence of either residence or
source states, technical definitions could be establishedmultilaterally, as, for example, the precise
definition of permanent establishment had no obvious distributive aspects.50
Some illustrations: the feasibility of a multilateral approach in tax matters
To illustrate the relevance of these observations, the authors will briefly discuss some examples
of tax policy changes. Some of the authors’ illustrations act as predictions of negotiation outcomes
of some of the proposals of the BEPS project (for example, those on treaty abuse and interest
deductions). But the authors’ point is more far-reaching than that: what do the authors’
observations tell us about the tax policy debates of the next decade? Each of the following cases
may lead the OECD Member States (and/or the G-20 Members) to reflect on their willingness
to participate in a multilateral instrument which generates outcomes that they would not have
chosen in a bilateral setting.
1. LOB rules
Under current rules of international taxation, entities may be given access to treaty benefits even
when they do not perform a relevant economic function within the group. Stronger requirements
(in terms of local economic activity) could well reduce “treaty shopping” in the economists’
broad sense of that concept. How would states perceive their interests? The authors suggest that
this is a matter of many winners and a few losers. Presently, the Netherlands and Luxemburg
together host 25 per cent of worldwide FDI stock. Behind this figure are, of course, most if not
all of the world’s MNEs. But when it is decided on the multilateral level that “withholding tax
shopping” should be ended, the number and political weight of the losers (which does include
Switzerland and to some extent the UK) should be manageable. Here, a multilateral instrument
might well work. Indeed, countries have committed to include a minimum level of protection
against treaty shopping in their treaties.51
As to the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) rule: the key terms of the rule are “reasonable”,
“principal purpose”, and “object and purpose”.52 These generate uncertain outcomes, and an
agreement along these lines is typically served by a multilateral approach. Evidently, it would
be in the interest of residence states to reduce source states’ incentives to broaden their tax
jurisdiction (by procedural safeguards, that is, dispute resolution and/or exchange of information
commitments). But “asymmetric interests” (each state is predominantly a source state in one
50S. Picciotto, International Business Taxation: A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press Electronic edn, 1992), 23.
51OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits, above fn.7, 10.
52OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits, above fn.7, 55.
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bilateral relationship, and a residence state in another) suggest the presence of a “veil of
uncertainty” enhancing a multilateral approach.53
2. Transfer pricing guidelines
The focus of Actions 8–10 of the BEPS project seems to be on refining the arm’s length standard
which has developed into the “rule of the road” for transactions between associated enterprises.
Hence, it is likely that refining the standards will not be met with a lot of resistance in a
multilateral negotiation, as they are of a highly technical nature. A different forecast, however,
applies in relation to the more difficult transfer pricing issues for which formulary apportionment
or unitary taxation-type solutions might be unavoidable. At the heart of BEPS lies the possibility
of “moving” intangibles out of the reach of a high-tax environment (particularly the US) towards
a low-tax state.54 The establishment of baselines and allocation standards for a formulary approach
(for example, labour, assets), or in other words: the establishment of the size and the shares of
the “tax pie”, inevitably involves a distributive problem that creates obvious (and foreseeable)
winners and losers. This explains the recent fears as regards the position of the US under BEPS:
its high corporate tax rate, would drive high-paid industries to Europe to take advantage of lower
tax rates.55 It is therefore not surprising that the final BEPS reports lack formulary
apportionment-type solutions. Moreover, the same considerations might affect the proposal on
country-by-country (CbC) reporting, to the extent that this could be considered a step in the
direction of formulary apportionment. Or, to put it differently: when the CbC-reporting proposal
gains broad support, it is exactly because it is not a credible step towards formulary apportionment.
3. Interest deductions
One of the strongest substantive recommendations of the BEPS project is the general adoption
of an earnings stripping rule.56 It consists of two parts: a fixed ratio rule (with a bandwidth of 10
to 30 per cent of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA))
and a group ratio rule (that would allow additional deduction of third-party interest if interest
payments of the worldwide group exceed the fixed ratio). The authors would suggest that this
is practically a “veil of uncertainty” situation. Most if not all states see their corporate tax bases
broadened, though the effect will be more limited in states that already operate limitations on
interest deduction. There may be a negative impact on investments, as the cost of capital
increases—but this impact is typically smaller as more countries join in. The OECD proposal
has much to make it the new “rule of the road” for deductibility of interest.
53 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits, above fn.7, provides states with a “menu” to choose from.
Where states choose different menu options, further bilateral negotiations would be required. Alternatively, states
could adopt a multilateral “rule of the road” which solves the conflict, e.g. the source state follows the resident state’s
treatment of the taxpayer.
54Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS” (2014) Florida Tax Review 55, 96.
55M.Mandel, “Obama’s Corporate Tax Blunder”, New York Times, 9 June 2015, available at: www.nytimes.com/2015
/06/10/opinion/obamas-corporate-tax-blunder.html?_r=0. [Accessed 18 January 2016].
56OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4: 2015 Final
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015) (Limiting Base Erosion
Involving Interest Deductions).
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What complicates the issue, however, is that Action 4 requires changes in domestic legislation.
The explanatory statement which accompanies the 2015 final BEPS reports notes that countries
have “agreed a general policy direction” on thematter,57while the Action 4 Final Report announces
a multilateral review process of implementation efforts and their impact on MNE behaviour.58
4. “Digital presence”
Now that international trade in goods and especially services can increasingly do without a
traditional permanent establishment, pressure has developed to widen the definition of local
“presence” in the source state. The OECD has suggested some options (Action 1), though the
Final Report makes no specific recommendations. This is understandable, as any proposal on
this issue would raise a clear distributive conflict. Assume that there is a proposal to replace
article 5 MTC by a sales criterion (for example, local sales create tax liability when exceeding
a fixed threshold amount), how would states be able to assess their own position? In this case,
the authors would suggest that the answer is reasonably clear: the US would lose, the rest of the
world might well win (or expect to win). The role of tax havens as “home state” to internet
services is a (potential) game changer. And in the end, it would be hard to estimate what amount
of tax money is involved (after all, Google and Microsoft do have PEs in Europe). The authors’
prediction would be: the level of uncertainty would not be enough to be able to hide a clear
distributional conflict between the US and the rest of the world. The debate on “digital presence”
may lead nowhere.
5. Minimum withholding tax rates
The BEPS project is not aimed at rearranging the international allocation of taxing rights. But
the pressure of NGOs on behalf of the interests of developing countries could lead to a focus on
minimum withholding tax rates. As a UN report recently observed:
“With the current international discussion about the need to ensure taxing rights over
economic engagement in one’s territory, and concern about profit shifting through
‘off-shoring’ intangible property (…) there is likely to be renewed interest in withholding
taxes as an efficient, and relatively secure against avoidance, means of enforcing source
State taxing rights.”59
Within the OECD area, the philosophy has always been that withholding taxes are hurdles
to international investment and should be reduced to, preferably, zero. But developing countries
have different interests. To these states, withholding taxes are much easier to handle with limited
administrative capacity. Here again we have an obvious distributive issue, but one that can easily
be politicised. A multilateral tax instrument could provide for a targeted solution, for example,
57 OECD, Explanatory Statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), available at: http:/
/www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf [Accessed 18 January 2016].
58OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions, above fn.56, 79–80.
59 UN Economic and Social Council, E/2013/67, Further Progress in Strengthening the Work of the Committee of
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters: Report of the Secretary-General (9 May 2013), available at:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/2013/67 [Accessed 18 January 2016].
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inserting 10 per cent minimum withholding tax rates in all treaties with qualifying developing
countries.
Summing up, the OECD Final Report avoids making proposals with evident distributional
impact, and makes strong recommendations on typical “rule of the road” issues. That increases
the likelihood that a multilateral instrument for amending bilateral tax treaties will gain widespread
support.
Modest expectations on the idea of multilateral agreement
Multilateral agreements as a forum for discussion
As referred to above,60 multilateral agreement is enhanced by the presence of a “veil of
uncertainty” and discouraged by the presence of obvious distributive issues, and multilateral
agreement tends to relate to the choice of principles and concepts, rather than specific rules. It
seems wise for the OECD to “manage” expectations on the matters that could be dealt with using
a multilateral tax instrument.
Goldsmith and Posner have argued that
“most multilateral treaties that are not purely hortatory are based on some form of embedded
bilateral cooperation. What little genuine multilateral cooperation we might see is thin, in
the sense that it does not require nations to depart much, if at all, from what they would
have done in the absence of the treaty.”61
While this is a very general kind of observation, the relevant point is that multilateral
agreements, when seen from the perspective of binding rules, are often non-committal. It would
be better to see such agreements as forums for further bargaining on issues collectively accepted
as relevant.62 In the words of Bodansky, a multilateral agreement
“can take on a momentum of its own, by providing a forum for discussions, serving as a
focal point for international public opinion, and building trust among participants”.63
This is for instance taking place in relation to the negotiations on the very complex and
uncertain issue of global warming.64 More specifically on multilateral tax treaties, Kim Brooks
points out that “multilateral treaties will not provide a panacea for the challenges of modern day
60See “A synthesis: uncertainty on distributional issues”.
61J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, “International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach” (2003) Virginia Journal
of International Law 113, 138.
62 James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation” (1998) International Organization
269.
63 D. Bodansky, WHO Technical Briefing Series: The Framework Convention/Protocol Approach (1999)
WHO/NCD/TFI/99.1.
64 The main instrument in this regard is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9
May 1992), 1771 UNTS 107. The instrument does not contain binding restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions but
rather sets commitments for further co-operation. See e.g. M. Bothe, “The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: An Unprecedented Multilevel Regulatory Challenge” (2003) Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 240; J.K. Sebenius, “Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case
of Global Warming” (1991) International Security 110.
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international tax planning”.65 Brooks underscores that underlying domestic tax systems and tax
administrations still need to be robust, and that some agreement about a minimum tax level, or
some other kind of tax harmonisation, is required.
Two rational design presumptions point towards using flexibility mechanisms
Thus far, the authors have argued that the prospects of multilateral agreement depend on the
absence of obvious economic gains (or losses) to be distributed over participating states, and/or
on a high level of uncertainty regarding the size of those gains for participating states. Both
considerations point in the direction of two “standard” rational design hypotheses, based on the
literature regarding the rational design of international agreements.66
Presumption 1: actors have an incentive to design institutions with flexibility when they are
faced with uncertainty about how the division of gains will work out in the future.67
By using flexibility arrangements, actors can “insure” themselves against unanticipated negative
consequences.68 Moreover, more flexible arrangements can lead to a “learning” process, in which
states learn over the course of time about the costs and benefits of policy action, thereby reducing
uncertainties.69 Such “learning” agreements are not aimed at providing once-and-for all solutions,
but are rather built to manage a problem in the future.
Presumption 2: statesmay reduce distributional problems by adopting amore flexible agreement
structure.70
For international tax, this flexibility is reflected in the fact that the reduction of double taxation
is organised bilaterally. Hence, this hypothesis does nothing more than reflect the conclusions
under “Bilateralism as a response to asymmetric interests” and “Bilateralism as a means to
maximise membership surplus”: bilateralism is favoured over multilateralism because it enables
states to maximise the membership surplus.
65Brooks, above fn.8, 236.
66 These hypotheses are based on some of the conjectures presented by Koremenos, et al., above fn.15. Their total
number of conjectures adds up to 16, and covers, among other things, membership (inclusive or restrictive), issue
scope (limited or broad), centralisation and flexibility.
67Koremenos, et al., above fn.15, 793.
68B. Koremenos, “Contracting around International Uncertainty” (2005) American Political Science Review 549.
69B. Koremenos, “Loosening the Ties That Bind: a Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility” (2001) International
Organization 289.
70Koremenos, et al., above fn.15, 794.
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Figure 1: design strategy: the argument
What types of flexibility mechanisms?
Presumptions 1 and 2 will therefore lead states to consider flexibility mechanismswhen designing
a multilateral agreement to amend bilateral tax treaties. The question then is: what types of
flexibility mechanisms could be considered?
Generally speaking, the literature on the rational design of international agreements
distinguishes between three types of flexibility mechanisms: transformative, adaptive and
interpretive flexibility.71 Transformative flexibility allows the institution itself to be changed so
that all actors can respond as circumstances change. It requires treaty provisions that permit and
regulate the renegotiation of a regime.Adaptive flexibility allows actors to depart from institutional
norms, for instance due to a change in domestic circumstances, whilst the institution itself remains
in place. The goal of this type of flexibility is to isolate external shocks, whilst the broader
institution is insulated from their impact. Examples of such rules are escape mechanisms and
withdrawal clauses. Finally, interpretive flexibility is a type of flexibility that has aspects of both
of the other two types: it grants individual participants leeway in interpreting and applying agreed
rules. The most common forms of this type of flexibility are the use of reservations, which ensure
71Koremenos, et al., above fn.15, 773; A. Thompson, “Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the
Global Climate Regime” (2010) European Journal of International Relations 269, 270–271 who first introduces
“interpretative” flexibility by the term “means flexibility”, and C. Marcoux, “Institutional Flexibility in the Design
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2009) Conflict Management and Peace Science 209. The latter two
articles are about agreements on environmental policy, which has provided international relations scholars with an
ideal case for investigating uncertainty-flexibility designs, as in this field, political processes are transparent and
outcomes distinct. See on flexibility more generally: L.R. Helfer, “Flexibility in International Agreements” in J.L.
Dunoff and M.A. Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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that states whose interests depart from the treaty’s text are not forced to make an all-or-nothing
choice, and the use of open norms.72
Although further research on possible flexibility mechanisms and their advantages and
disadvantages would be necessary, the underlying problem structure of an “amending agreement”
for international taxation tentatively points in the direction of using a combination of both
interpretive as well as transformative flexibility mechanisms. Indeed, Presumption 1 points in
the direction of creating broad general norms, which contain interpretative flexibility by allowing
states to “insure” themselves against uncertain future outcomes of a multilateral agreement. This
enables states to create solutions as they go along. Additionally, a transformative flexibility
design allows states to tackle completely new problems as they come up. This reflects the wish
of the OECD to create an “innovative approach to international tax matters, reflecting the rapidly
evolving nature of the global economy”.73 Once detailed commitments are under negotiation,
Presumption 2 points in the direction of a generous use of reservations. Reservations tomultilateral
norms create (potentially bilateral) arrangements between parties within the multilateral regime,
providing a flexible solution to the distribution problem. Although this strategy comes at the
cost of uniformity and complexity, states individually remain in control over proposed solutions
whilst the agreement’s principal purpose (to amend the network of bilateral tax treaties) is not
lost out of sight.
Two regimes that meet these flexibility requirements can be considered.Where required, each
of these regimes can be accompanied by modalities such as those mentioned in the progress
report on Action 15 (for example, by opt-outs, opt-ins or by giving states the choice over
alternative provisions).74
A first potential design strategy can be found in the framework convention-protocol design,
in which states initially focus on the negotiation of broad, standard-setting commitments. Once
consensus has built up, detailed commitments are fleshed out in protocols. Such broad norms
set directions for further negotiation, functioning as focal points for further negotiation, whilst
the institutional setup of the regime facilitates the gathering of further information on the problem
and builds confidence among participants. This prevents negotiation breakdown. Once parties
start negotiating detailed commitments, the framework convention/protocol design allows the
inclusion of certain parties only, providing a “menu” for states wishing to solve a problem, whilst
reservations can be used to tailor-make solutions to the taste of the individual state.
A second design strategy would be what the authors term an “agreement to scope”. Under
such an agreement, states commit to renegotiate their bilateral tax treaties on certain multilaterally
agreed broad and delimitated objectives or norms.75 The authors imagine such an agreement to
be comparable to a directive as used within the EU, which requires Member States to achieve a
certain result without dictating the means of doing so. Such a multilateral agreement thereby
“limits the scope” of bilateral tax treaty negotiations, as parties agree to negotiate solely and
72Marcoux, above fn.71, 211–212.
73OECD, Action Plan, above fn.4, 24.
74OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument, above fn.5, annex A, section A.2.
75 Such an instrument is called a “pactum de negotiando” in public international law, in which parties agree to
subsequently agree on further legal acts. See e.g. H. Owada, “Pactum de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando” in R.
Wolfrum (ed.),Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010); A. Miaja De La Muela,
“Pacta de Contrahendo en Derecho Internacional Publico” (1968) Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 392.
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only on the multilaterally set objectives. To ensure the expeditious amendment of the bilateral
conventions, the multilateral regime can provide a binding timeframe and a monitoring and
reporting mechanism.
Conclusions
In predicting how negotiations will turn out for the multilateral instrument of Action 15 of the
BEPS Action Plan, the authors have begun by using the neoliberal insights in the work of Rixen
and Thompson and Verdier. These insights explain why the reduction of withholding taxes is
organised bilaterally, as this provides states with the instrument to maximise their membership
surplus (in the terms of Thompson and Verdier) or their gains in an asymmetrical distribution
conflict (as reasoned by Rixen).
This line of thought, however, does not fully account for externalities of the tax treaties
network, such as those caused by BEPS. Internalising these external effects requires collective
action. However, before states agree to a multilateral arrangement, they must be able to foresee
some gains resulting from multilateral co-operation in comparison to likely alternatives (such
as further loss of corporate income tax revenues, or increasing reliance on unilateral rules to
protect the national tax base). It is here that the authors formulate their model: although some
distributive benefits/membership surplus might be gained through multilateral co-operation in
relation to BEPS, there is a great deal of uncertainty about how significant these gains are. In
the face of uncertainty, a state that evaluates its interest in alternative courses of action will tend
to be risk-averse. This implies that it will tend to agree on “fair” multilateral arrangements, that
is, arrangements that may be expected to generate acceptable outcomes for a broad range of
future states-of-the-world. Hence, as the impact of different policy options is more difficult to
measure, discussions will move away from quarrels over distribution, in which states will seek
individual control over decision making, towards finding principles and rules that can be
considered “fair”.
These two factors (the size of the gains to be distributed, and the level of uncertainty
surrounding that size) can then inform us about the feasibility of different future policy actions,
as well as about the design of a multilateral arrangement. Multilateral approaches can be helpful
in improving and reformulating “rules of the road”. Remaining distribution problems and
uncertainty concerns can be relaxed by flexible regime design options.
The recommendations of the BEPS Final Report are, therefore, useful to the extent that they
provide a starting point for reconsidering the architecture of international taxation, that is, for
answering the question: “what would we want the taxation ofMNE profits to look like in 2025?”
That in no way implies success in the near or even remote future. As in many other areas of
international co-operation, progress may be slow or indecisive. But by focusing on “rules of the
road” and avoiding issues with clear distributional impact, the OECD has increased the likelihood
that a multilateral instrument for amending bilateral tax treaties will gain widespread support.
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